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Abstract 
Nurse related adverse events occur not because nurses intentionally hurt patients, but rather that the 
health care environment is so complex that outcomes for each patient are affected by a range of factors 
and not just the competence of an individual nurse. Effects of the “sharp end’ where nurses find them-
selves being vulnerable to errors occurring must be removed from nurses and put squarely on the 
shoulders of the nursing leadership who must focus on systems factors, not individual nurses to blame, 
as a strategy to constructively manage nurse related adverse events. The purpose of this study was to 
explore and describe the experiences of operational managers (Unit Managers) regarding the manage-
ment of nurse related adverse events by their line managers in a regional hospital in Gauteng, South Af-
rica. A qualitative, exploratory, descriptive and contextual research design was used. A purposive sample 
of operational managers working in the specific hospital who had experienced the management of nurse 
related adverse events by their line managers and willing to participate was selected for the study. Data 
collection was by means of in depth phenomenological individual interviews and data were analysed by 
the researcher and an independent coder using Tesch’s open coding method .The findings revealed that 
operational managers experienced a culture of blame during the management of nurse related adverse 
events with suggestions for development of nursing leadership strategies that focus on a blame free just 
culture to facilitate the constructive management of these events.  
Keywords 
Nurse related adverse events ; operational managers ; blame culture  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Although the provision of quality nursing care is a nurse’s professional responsibility and a patient’s expectation, nurse 
related adverse events (NRAEs) in health care services are reported daily in the national and international media. Ref-
erence [1] reported that adverse events (AE) were on the increase in Gauteng hospitals, with the number of incidents 
having escalated from 119 in 2006 to 229 in 2011. Reference [2] claimed that AEs occur not because bad people inten-
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tionally hurt patients but rather because the present system of healthcare is so complex that the successful treatment and 
outcome for each patient depends on a range of factors, and not just the competence of an individual nurse.   
Reference [3] and [4] reported that as the largest health care workforce, nurses apply their knowledge, skills, and expe-
rience to attend to the patients’ various and changing needs. When care falls short of standards, whether because of re-
source allocation such as workforce shortages, lack of necessary medical equipment, or lack of appropriate policies and 
standards, nurses shoulder much of the responsibility and the blame. This reflects the continued misunderstanding of the 
greater effects of the numerous, complex health care systems and the work environment factors. The authors assert that 
an understanding of the complexity of the work environment and engaging in strategies to improve its effects is para-
mount to higher-quality, safer care, that is more necessary than apportioning blame on nurses [4]. Reference [4] corrob-
orates [3] these views by asserting that when nursing leadership only focuses on quick fixes or walk-abouts instead of 
the contributing factors to the AE, the problems simply reoccur on subsequent shifts because nurses repeat the cycle of 
trying to keep up with the crisis of the day. The authors refer to these approaches as short-sightedness and suggest that 
nurse managers and those who shape the organisational climate need to change, to value some new qualities as an ap-
proach to managing the NRAEs as they occur.  
Reference [3] asserts that some hospitals are described as experiencing the “vulnerable system syndrome”, and are 
viewed as pathological services that have a culture of individual blame, denial, and punishment of staff involved in AE, 
covering up of errors, and common failures being considered as isolated events. Nursing leadership and peers in such 
work environments target individual nurses as being at the “sharp end” of the AEs .This means that the majority of er-
rors waiting to happen from the work environment makes the nurses to be considered as being at the receiving end of 
the AEs “sharp end” which results in blame, abuse [3]. Effects of the ‘sharp end’ must be removed from nurses and 
placed squarely on the shoulders of the nursing leadership, to focus on systems factors instead of individuals, as a strat-
egy to manage NRAEs constructively.  
References [3], [4] and [5] report that it is essential to recognise that errors or preventable AEs are not the defects 
themselves, but are simply the symptoms or indicators that there are defects elsewhere in the system. In other words, the 
error is just the tip of the iceberg; it is what lies underneath and not the just the individual nurse that nurse leaders need 
to worry about. When serious investigations of preventable AEs are undertaken, the error simply serves as the starting 
point and a reminder that nurses, like most human beings, make mistakes, and that errors do occur, which calls for a 
more careful examination of the contributing system defects that led to the error.  The above authors claim that a 
common but misdirected response to managing errors is to ‘put out the fire’, identify the individuals involved, deter-
mine their culpability, schedule them for retraining or disciplinary action, introduce new procedures, and issue procla-
mations for greater vigilance [3] and [4]. Reference [3] corroborates this viewpoint by asserting that the approach aimed 
at the individual nurse when an AE occurs is seen as the equivalent of swatting individual mosquitoes rather than 
draining the swamp to address the source of the problem. The author further reported that rather than falling into the 
trap of continuously focusing on human error and searching for individuals to blame, a systems approach attempts to 
identify the contributing factors to substandard performance and finds ways to better detect and recover from problems 
that could result in harm to patients.  
Reference [6] reported that too few nurses are adequately supported by their organisations following their involvement 
in NRAEs, leaving nurses feeling as though they have failed the patients in their care. Reference [7] corroborates this by 
reporting that management does not support nurses following their involvement in NRAEs. As soon as a NRAE has 
occurs  organisations reportedly acquire statements, question the witnesses, and blame the nurses for the AE, instead 
of supporting, guiding,  and showing them what needs to be done and how it needs to be done. These nurses who have 
experienced NRAEs are left feeling demoralised and demotivated, and they suffer loss of confidence and loss of 
self-esteem in their workplace, feeling personally responsible for the unexpected patient outcomes. Due to the lack of 
support from the hospital management, some nurses are left traumatised in the workplace resulting in poor nursing care, 
with more AE occurring, while other nurses leave the profession [3 and 7].  
At the National Quality Improvement Conference in South Africa, [8]) reported that there was an urgent need to elimi-
nate ad hoc responses to AEs, and to ensure that quality improvement measures driven by an informed leadership must 
prevent such occurrences. Reference [9] argues that this culture of blame arises, where individual responsibility for 
mistake or blame is apportioned when ‘things go wrong’. As such there is an assumption that openness and transparen-
cy, including forms of incident reporting, make possible the allocation of individual responsibility and therefore serve to 
distribute blame and possibly secure some form of retribution. Further to this assertion a call to break free from the 
“blame cycle” and promote a “reporting culture” without fear of being blamed is also advocated by the authors. Refer-
ence [10] also proclaimed that developing a strong culture of transparency and accountability will squash the culture of 
blame in organisations in support of breaking free from the culture of blame.  
The aforementioned literature articulates the imperative of this study, which is to develop and describe strategies for the 
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constructive management of NRAEs that moves away from a culture of blame to a blame free ,just culture taking cog-
nisance of accountability where appropriate, hence the relevance of this study. 
 
2. Research design and Method 
The design for this study is a qualitative, exploratory, descriptive, and contextual research design that was chosen to 
facilitate a systematic enquiry to explore and describe the phenomenon of interest which is the lived experiences of op-
erational managers(OMs) regarding a culture of blame during the management of NRAEs in a regional hospital in 
Gauteng, South Africa. 
2.1. Research method 
The research method for this study constitutes the research strategy for nursing leadership strategy development, the 
population, sample and sampling methods, methods of data collection, data analysis, and trustworthiness, with ethical 
principles being applied throughout the study.  
2.2. Population and sampling  
A research population is known as a well-defined collection of individuals known to have similar characteristics. All 
individuals within a certain population usually have a common, binding characteristic or trait that are of interest to the 
researcher, and they must meet the criteria that the researcher has set for the study [11]. In this study the target popula-
tion is all the OMs working in a specific hospital in Gauteng who interact within the patient care environment.  
A purposive sample for the study was selected from 32 OMs who manage the wards, and who are involved either di-
rectly or indirectly in the management of NRAEs when they occur, and those that were willing to participate in the 
study. This was to ensure that rich data that was necessary to achieve the objectives of the study could be obtained. The 
number of participants was be determined by data saturation, which means that no new data or new information emerg-
es from participants during data collection [11]. Data saturation was reached at the 12
th
 participant. 
 
 2.3. Data collection 
In depth individual phenomenological interviews were conducted by the researcher using different communication 
techniques which allowed for deeper understanding into the phenomenon under study. During the interviews the re-
searcher asked the participants the following research question:  
“Would you tell me how you experience the management of NRAEs in this hospital?” 
Each interview session was approximately 30 to 45 minutes long, and interviews continued until data was saturated, that 
is when the interviews no longer yielded any new information. The interviews were captured using an audio recorder to 
capture the data verbatim following voluntary consent being obtained from the participants.  
2.4. Data analysis 
Data analysis was carried out in the form of thematic analyses, making use of Tesch’s eight steps of the descriptive 
method of data analysis [12]. In qualitative studies, data analysis occurs concurrently with data collection.  The re-
searcher and an independent coder, who is a D. Cur graduate with extensive experience in qualitative data analyses, 
were involved in the data analysis process. The researcher and the independent coder familiarised themselves with the 
data gathered by re-reading notes and transcripts, recalling experiences that were tabled, and listening to tapes until they 
became immersed in the data. As data collection proceeded, data was reduced via the process of transcribed field notes 
and transcripts, coding, clustering, partitioning, and writing memos. Consensus discussion meetings were held between 
the researcher and the independent coder to verify and refine the identified themes and categories.  
 
2.5. Measures to ensure trustworthiness 
The researcher used [13] model criteria for trustworthiness which are credibility, dependability, confirmability, trans-
ferability and authenticity to evaluate the application of these measures into the study.  
Nurse related adverse events and culture of blame 
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2.6. Ethics in research 
Principles that respect and protect human rights according to [14] which are principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, 
principle of justice, respect the human dignity of all the participants were all applied consistently throughout the study. 
The researcher obtained ethical from the Faculty of Health Sciences of the University of Johannesburg: Ethical Clear-
ance No. AEC51-01-2013. 
3. Discussion of findings 
The findings that emerged from the interviews as well as field notes are supported by verbatim quotes which are presented 
in italics and field notes are captured in bold and not italicised. The findings which were supported by literature formed 
the foundation for the development of nursing leadership strategies to facilitate the constructive management of nurse 
related adverse events in the regional hospital in Gauteng. Some relevant quotations derived from literature that were 
found to lend strong support to some of the findings and provide depth to this study are presented in bold italics and 
referenced and their rationale for their inclusion is provided.  
The researcher’s observation during data collection was that while participants were keen to participate in the study, they 
appeared apprehensive and did not want to be seen presenting themselves for interviews, though confidentiality and 
anonymity was pledged by the researcher. Another observation was that participants found it difficult and emotional to 
relate their lived experiences of how the adverse events are managed by their line managers. Despite the emotions, par-
ticipants expressed their appreciation of being given an opportunity to verbalise their experiences of blame as follows: 
“Thank you for giving me the opportunity to talk about what happens to us at work.  We do not know who to talk to, to 
relieve the stress we experience”. In a study conducted by [15] similar responses were identified where participants that 
were interviewed were initially apprehensive (their own words) but were grateful for the opportunity to voice their own 
experiences of aggression in their lives.  
3.1. Participants experiences of a culture of blame 
Culture of blame:  Participants experienced being blamed by their line managers as an initial response to the man-
agement of all adverse events. This is presented in Table 1 below. 
TABLE 1. Operational managers experiences of a culture of blame  
THEME  :  
Culture of blame 
Participants (OMs) experienced being blamed by their assistant directors (ADs) as an 
initial response to the management of all adverse events. 
Categories 1.1 Blaming for organisational factors  
In this study the organisation was characterised by a culture of blame that prevailed when nurse related adverse events 
occurred and were managed by the line managers. Reference [16] defines blame as finding fault with (for something) 
and to place responsibility for an error or fault on someone or something. The [17] describes the culture of blame as the 
tendency to look for one person or organisation that can be held responsible for a bad state of affairs or accident.  Ref-
erence [18] reported that blame drives defensiveness and reduces collaboration, openness and learning in the corporate 
culture. This then results in poor operating performance, poor employee engagement and poor client experiences which 
is a concern.  
In this study all 12 participants (OMs) verbalised during the in depth phenomenological individual interviews that they 
experienced being blamed as a given response to the management of all adverse events by their line managers.  
“You get blamed for things that are not your fault, blame is pushed to you.” 
Reference [19] reported that cultures of blame within some hospital settings still persist and that nurses are blamed 
too frequently when a miscommunication results in errors. Blame was reported to also increase the occurrence of 
adverse events, reducing accountability, objectivity, transparency, process improvement and patient safety .A cul-
Ally et al. 
 
 5
 
ture of blame rather than one of justice and accountability for action was reported to create an atmosphere of in-
timidation and preventing nurses from asking authorities appropriate questions or challenging others’ decisions 
[19]. This is corroborated by [10] who reported that a culture of blame can become toxic when it infiltrates an or-
ganisation and asserted that a culture of blame rather than one of justice and accountability for action creates an 
atmosphere of intimidation and prevents nurses from asking authorities appropriate questions or challenging others’ 
decisions. This articulates the imperative for the development of nursing leadership strategies to facilitate the con-
structive management of nurse related adverse events in the regional hospital in Gauteng which implies a para-
digm shift from a culture of blame to a blame free, just culture based on caring principles.  
Due to the pervasive nature of the culture of blame as experienced by the participants in this study, the researcher 
presents a historical perspective of the culture of blame to support the findings, elucidate its seriousness for organ-
isations and for providing a broader perspective of the culture of blame for the reader. 
     3.1. 1. A historical perspective to a culture of blame in organisations 
Reference [20] reported that historically, hospitals operated under the assumption that health care services in-
volved the work of a sole expert clinician with an individual patient. This meant that when an error occurred, the 
clinician was blamed and faced punitive action. As long ago as 2100 BC, the Code of Hammurabi called for 
amputation of a surgeon’s hands if he committed a surgical error [20]. A blame culture in hospitals according to 
the above authors was made to flourish by compliance-driven, bureaucratic management styles that demand 
personal accountability for systemic problems. The traditional process for conducting root-cause analyses (RCA) 
was reported as a contributory factor to a blame culture in organisations where they [20] reported that the nurse 
manager attended a root cause analysis (RCA) meeting for a medication error involving one of the nurses. The 
medical error was reportedly caused by a system factor, but the blame was being directed at the nurse despite the 
error being caused by a system factor. System factors include the nature of the work performed, the physical en-
vironment, human-system interfaces, the organizational/social environment, management, and external factors 
[3]. Meanwhile, [20] assert that the system factors which cause the adverse events persist, continuing to put pa-
tients at risk for harm and nurses at risk for blame. 
Participants in this study lamented that they were blamed for every adverse event that occurred even when not at 
the vicinity of the occurrence at the particular time and even when they were not on duty. They also experienced 
that blame was shifted to them though they were not responsible for the problem.  
Experiences of blame were articulated as follows by participants (OMs): 
 “Mmmm - The first time the fault (adverse event) happened, it was caused by the manager (AD) but she shifted 
the blame to me.”  
“You get blamed for things that are not your fault, blame is pushed to you.” 
Another participant said; 
“Even if there are weak cot sides and patient falls out of bed, you are asked why you were using that cot side. If 
things go wrong, due to faulty equipment, malfunctioning equipment, we get blamed.”  
Reference [18] argued that organisations which adopt a culture of blame, assign “unjustifiable” blame in re-
sponse to random short-term underperformance or in cases of errors which is undesirable.  
In this study participants said that when the incidents happen, even if problems are related to management prac-
tices of the hospital, in terms of faulty equipment and organisational factors, the blame is shifted to them (OMs). 
The researcher’s interpretation here is that the participants are saying that the cot sides were weak, a possibility 
of malfunctioning equipment. When the adverse event occurred , the questions are asked as to why that equip-
ment was used.  
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Other participants experienced the culture of blame for issues beyond their control as follows:  
“if patients attempt to take their life, no one can stop them. Patient will go to the bathroom, close the door and 
take his life. Management blames the nurse.”  
 “……Serious incidents when a patient died, the area manager was called and made aware, we wrote reports. 
There is blaming of each other.”  
Reference [10] postulated that much of the blame-shifting is an effort to protect oneself which, in the context of 
this study, the line managers blame the operational managers for all adverse events as a strategy not to be seen 
by others as a failure, or as lacking self-control.  
A participant said; 
 “……Like when a patient falls, the patient’s family will blame you, as well as management as if you are lying. 
They blame you, yet the patient was weak.” 
References [3] and [4] asserted that there are human factors with a focus on human beings and their interaction 
with products, devices, procedures, work spaces, and the environments encountered at work and in daily living. 
The assertions support the above findings that most individuals have encountered a product or piece of equip-
ment or a work environment that leads to less than optimal human performance. The authors describe the human 
factors research as the knowledge about human strengths and limitations to the design of interactive systems of 
people, equipment, and their environment to ensure their effectiveness, safety, and ease of use.  
Reference [18] reported in their study that when failures or errors occur in high performing organisations, a 
strategy of continual improvement rather than blaming is fostered and further suggested that leadership should 
become more open and curious to improve situations instead of blaming and being defensive. In addition, [18] 
further reported in their study that low performing organisations had a culture of blame with associated fear and 
low morale among workers. The leadership in the organisations and how it contributed to the blame culture was 
also reported. The statements revealed low self-awareness amongst the leadership as perpetrators of a culture of 
blame, which could possibly be the situation in this study; hence all participants experienced blame as an initial 
response to the management of NRAEs in the hospital. 
In this study the culture of blame was experienced as pervasive and a spontaneous response to the management 
of the nurse related adverse events that occur. Participants were blamed without the consideration of their inter-
action with the equipment and their environment (context).The operational managers are the proverbial “scape 
goat” which gets blamed for organisational factor issues which are essentially factors that are beyond their con-
trol.  
     3.1. 2. Blaming for organisational factors 
Reference [21] and [22] describes organisational factors as factors or processes that are used in an organisation 
to enable its health care professionals to work effectively and harmoniously towards achieving its vision, mis-
sion and goals e.g. institutional policies, nurse staffing, and other processes which could inadvertently contribute 
to worse outcomes and adverse events while [23] reported that organisational factors were associated with oper-
ational failures needing insight into effective strategies for removal and managing these factors.  
Participants in this study experienced being blamed from all sides i.e. from the nursing management, ward staff 
and patients family for adverse events that were beyond their control and rather related to organisation factors 
articulated as  shortage of staff, shortage of beds, lack of security for vulnerable patients,  lack of clear poli-
cies and procedures and faulty equipment. [22] suggested in support of the above, that organisational factors 
play a strong and significant role in the occurrence of adverse events , yet OMs in this study were blamed for 
that with nothing being done to address those factors.  
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Figure 1 presents the organisational factors that OMs were blamed for during the management of NRAEs. 
 
FIGURE 1 : Organisational factors that participants were blamed for 
Participants cited that they experienced being blamed for incidents that occurred when they were not there like a 
patient that jumped out of bed and a situation of a patient being burnt because of a faulty thermostat. One par-
ticipant articulated being compromised by the environment which increased the vulnerability to adverse events. 
This is evidenced by the following quotations from participants; 
“Sometimes a patient may jump out of bed. You are blamed for the incident and yet you cannot be everywhere at 
the same time.”   
 “The boiler …… that thing for hot water….mmmmm ehh thermostat or something ? was not working….but we 
got blamed.” 
Reference [24] suggested that an increase in reported adverse events in the work environment resulted from a 
variety of stresses, including situations in which work demands could not be met because of a lack of resources 
such as support from co-workers and supervisors, variations in workload, a higher number of emergency admis-
sions to/discharges from a patient care unit in 24 hours. 
In this study organisational factors that were expressed as a lack of security, weak cot sides, patient overflows 
with a shortage of staff were some aspects that nurses were blamed for, yet these were aspects for nursing lead-
ership accountability and not the operational managers’ prerogative. 
Participants further experiences of blame from organisational factors such as staff shortages was evidenced by 
quotes as follows: 
 “We were short staffed and overworked in ward…… (mentions the name of ward)  when the incident hap-
pened ….. I was blamed. Management (AD) blames the nurse, but (AD) should know the nurse, patient ratio. 
Because patients must also take responsibility of what has happened.” (The incident is not mentioned because it 
will compromise the anonymity of the participant). 
The researcher identified during data collection that this participant lamented that as an operational manager of 
the ward, she had realised that the ward was short staffed, nurses were overworked, but when the incident hap-
pened she (OM) was blamed although the shortage of staff compromised the safety of the patients. 
Of concern is that the ADs blame the OMs for the AEs even though the cause was due to organisational factors. 
The OMs blame the ADs for the abusive treatment and the culture of blame –yet no one seems to take responsi-
Shortage of staff 
Shortage of beds 
Lack of clear policies and 
procedures 
lack of security for 
vulnerable patients 
Faulty equipment 
BLAMED  
FOR 
ORGANISATIONAL 
FACTORS 
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bility or direct the AEs to a platform where it can be constructively managed. The processes are however not 
there for the constructive management of AEs hence the relevance of this study whose purpose is to develop 
nursing leadership strategies to facilitate the constructive management of the nurse related adverse events. 
Another participant said: 
“But most are like that. No one does anything about the questions asked when adverse events happen. Hospital 
equipment is not up to standard these days. But we get blamed and traumatised .I will write and tell my other 
experiences.”  
This participant was emotional and visibly traumatised. She chose not to continue with the interview and prom-
ised to submit the rest of her experiences in writing as a naïve sketch. Crying. She was offered support and water 
before leaving. The researcher followed up the participant at a later date but the participant was not willing to 
continue with the interview nor did she submit the naïve sketch as promised. This was respected by the re-
searcher and the participant was thanked for the valuable input provided. 
Reference [23] reported that the tendency to blame other departments’ employees rather than to systematic 
causes created a significant impediment to improvement because opportunities to work collaboratively to im-
prove organisational work systems went unrecognized.   
Some participants experienced being blamed further by management as well as family members:  
“Management (ADs) and relatives ask, “what did you do to burn the patient, as though patient was burnt on 
purpose. Questions are asked as if we did it deliberately. They (ADs) make me feel I am lazy, as if I did not work 
hard to prevent the incident. Then I ask myself – was I compromised by the environment?”  
 “The patient’s family will blame you as well as management as if you are lying.” 
Other participants asserted experiencing the culture of blame in relation to the vulnerable patient environment 
where there were no security measures as a result the patient went missing ,as follows: 
“The place is not suitable for vulnerable patients . There are no security measures. You get blamed for things 
that are not your fault, blame is pushed to you.” 
“ there is passing the buck , the ward (mentions ward) was not well secured but we were blamed for the patient 
that went missing .” (Operational manager was blamed for a poorly secured ward). 
The OMs displayed  pain  for the blaming that occurred even for AEs that are way beyond their control. Ref-
erence [25] described Silence Truth as a symbolic name given to indicate issues covered by silence. In this study, 
the fear of being blamed was accompanied by unspoken words (Silence Truth) of not reporting as they (OMs) 
knew that blame would be apportioned to them with consequences. The researcher notes this as a cause for con-
cern in view of the adverse events that may go unreported. 
A participant said;  
“You do not feel like reporting, it seems as if you did it deliberately.” The researcher identified that participants 
were overwhelmed with the fear of being blamed and the consequences as a result some participants were reluc-
tant to report adverse events. This is supported by [26] who reported that many healthcare workers may not re-
port an adverse event for fears of retaliation and blame. A non-punitive, blame –free reporting culture improves 
adverse events reporting and is substantiated by reporting that a pediatric clinic in North Carolina found that af-
ter introducing a new blame-free system, reported mistakes exploded from five to 86 per year on average [26].  
The researcher has articulated concerns regarding the culture of blame and believes that nursing leadership 
needs to commit to change the way nurse related adverse events are managed with a focus on the facilitation of 
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the constructive management of the events by facilitating a Just Culture which does not support the punishment 
of staff that made mistakes but has zero tolerance for reckless behavior. Rather than blaming , nursing leadership 
should be supportive, offer coaching and education if the mistake was inadvertent, or occurred in a system that 
was not supportive of safety.  
4. Recommendations 
It is recommended that a supportive strategy to facilitate a non-punitive, blame-free culture (Just Culture) in the 
management of nurse related adverse events be implemented in the regional hospital for possible replication to 
other hospitals as well. This requires facilitation of a transition from a culture of blame to adoption of a blame 
free non-punitive just culture when managing the NRAEs which is however cognisant of accountability when 
the dynamics inherent in the event warrants it. 
5. Conclusion 
The researcher is of the opinion that everyone makes mistakes, and according to [3] no nurse goes to work with 
the intention to harm a patient. The blaming was also experienced as a lack of caring which justifies the devel-
opment of nursing leadership strategies to facilitate the constructive management of NRAEs from a blame cul-
ture to a just culture with caring elements. 
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